

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1890
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0630

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DEC 16 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

THE 123RD MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE FINAL
ONE OF THE CURRENT ROUND, TOOK PLACE ON DEC 16 UNDER US CHAIRMAN-
SHIP. SOVIET REP (TARASOV) AND US REP MADE THE ONLY FORMAL
STATEMENTS. US REP'S STATEMENT AND ADDITIONAL, IMPROMPTU
REMARKS MADE BY SOVIET REP FOLLOWING IT ARE REPORTED BY SEPTELS.
IN HIS EARLIER, FORMAL PRESENTATION, SOVIET REP SUMMARIZED
MAIN EASTERN ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE EAST'S FEB 19 PROPOSAL
AND PRINCIPAL EASTERN CRITICISMS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO
REDUCTIONS. THE FULL TEXT OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

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1. THE COMPLETION OF THE TENTH ROUND ALLOWS US TO REVIEW THE
PRESENT STAGE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION
OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE SITUATION
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING NOW IS TO UNCOVER
THE OBSTACLES AND HINDRANCES ON THE PATH OF ADVANCING THE TALKS,
TO FIND WAYS OF OVERCOMING THESE OBSTACLES, AND TO USE THOSE

PARTS OF THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WHICH CAN BECOME THE BASIS FOR A FUTURE AGREEMENT. THIS IS HOW THE DELGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION VIEWS ITS OWN TASK.

2. THE PEOPLES HAVE LONG EXPECTED PRACTICAL RESULTS FROM THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE A PRESSING NECESSITY FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND DEEPENING OF THE PROCESSES OF DETENTE AND OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS THIS CONSIDERATION WHICH GOVERNS THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF ALL THE SOCIALIST STATES TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. SPEAKING AT THE OCTOBER PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY L I BREZHNEV UNDERLINED IN PARTICULAR THAT "THE SOVIET UNION AS BEFORE CONSIDERS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS TO BE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCCESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE ARE PROPOSING THERE CONCRETE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES FACING EACH OTHER IN EUROPE WITHOUT DAMAGING THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE".

4. THERE IS EVERY REASON TO SAY THAT 1976 HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED BY ACTIVE EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST STATES TO SECURE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. TWICE DURING THE PRESENT YEAR, IN THE EIGHTH AND IN THE NINTH ROUNDS, THEY MADE MAJOR AND IMPORTANT INITIATIVES. APPROACHING THE TENTH ROUND, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES DEPARTED FROM THE FACT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE AT LAST A BREAK-THROUGH

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IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO GET DOWN TO WORKING OUT THE FIRST PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS.

5. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DID NOT RESTRICT THEMSELVES TO STATEMENTS CONCERNING WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY PUT FORWARD CONCRETE NUMERICAL DATA CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THESE FORCES AND THEY INDICATED PRECISELY THE DEFINITE VOLUMES, TIMINGS AND WAYS BY WHICH EACH OF THE SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE ITS ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT ROUND WE HAVE NOT SIMPLY CALLED FOR THE MAXIMAL CONCRETISATION OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT WE HAVE PROPOSED IN ONE OR ANOTHER FORM TO IDENTIFY THOSE PROVISIONS UPON WHICH IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN COMING TOWARDS A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO DEFINE PRECISELY THOSE PROBLEMS ON WHICH IT IS NECESSARY TO FIND COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS. THE PROPOSALS OF FEB 19, 1976 WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY SUPPLEMENT AND DEVELOP THE PROGRAMME OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND

ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE PUT FORWARD BY THE SOCIALIST STATES
IN NOV 1973 CAN SERVE AS THE WIDE BASIS FOR THE WORKING OUT
OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

6. ONE OF THE MAIN DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE FEB 19
PROPOSALS IS THAT THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS
OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES EVEN WITH THE
MODIFICATIONS TO THAT POSITION WHICH WERE MADE ON 16 DEC 1975.
HERE ONE IS TALKING PRINCIPALLY ABOUT OUR AGREEMENT TO DIVIDE
THE REDUCTION INTO TWO STAGES. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE NATO
COUNTRIES REGARD THE TWO PHASE ASPECT OF REDUCTION AS THE
KEY PROVISION IN THEIR POSITION. WE TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE WESTERN
DESIRE TO CONCLUDE TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, THAT IS TO SAY ONE
FOR EACH STAGE OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES. THE WESTERN REPS
CANNOT BUT RECOGNISE THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE ALSO MET
THEM ON THE QUESTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS.

7. ALL THIS REPRESENTS MAJOR COMPROMISE ELEMENTS IN OUR POSITION.
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BUT WHAT IS NO LESS SUBSTANTIAL IS THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
THE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS BY THE USA TO REDUCE A DEFINITE PART
OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONRY, WE INCLUDED IN OUR PROPOSALS A PROVISION
REGARDING REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF
NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND TACTICAL MISSILES WITH A DEFINITE
NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON A MUTUAL BASIS. IN THIS WAY
THE SOVIET UNION DEMONSTRATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO CARRY OUT AN
EQUIVALENT REDUCTION WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THIS SPHERE
WHICH BALANCES THE OBLIGATIONS OF THESE TWO STATES.

8. ALL THIS SHOWS THE SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH OF
THE SOCIALIST STATES TO THE REALISATION OF THE AIMS OF THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE FULL CORRESPONDENCE OF OUR PROPOSALS
TO THE DECISIONS OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, AND THE ACCOUNT
WHICH OUR PROPOSALS TAKE OF THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN
SCHEME WHICH DO NOT CONTRADICT THE AGREED PRINCIPLES, IN
PARTICULAR THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR BOTH
SIDES, CREATE A WIDE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

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FROM US REP MBFR

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

9. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT A FUTURE AGREEMENT MUST BE A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO BE CONVINCED OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SAME GOOD WILL AND PREPAREDNESS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN STATES. FOR THE TIME BEING UNFORTUNATELY THE LINES WHICH THEY TAKE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE A QUITE DIFFERENT AIM. THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS OF FORCES BEFORE DECEMBER 16 LAST YEAR AND SUBSEQUENTLY IS INFORMED WITH AN ASPIRATION TO RECEIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES AND TO CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC BLOC.

10. THE MAIN CASE OF THE DELEGATIONS FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES CONTINUES TO BE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR SO-CALLED "ASYMMETRIC" IE UNEQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS IMPAIRING THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS THEY INSIST AS BEFORE ON AN ALMOST THREE TIMES GREATER VOLUME OF REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN COMPARISON WITH NATO. BUT NOBODY AND NOTHING CAN CONVINCE US THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS COME ABOUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE CHANGED TO THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IS A RESULT OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION CARRIED OUT BY STATES FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF INTERESTS TOUCHING THEIR SECURITY.

11. THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, WHICH IS CHARACTERISED BY APPROXIMATE EQUALITY, IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING STABILITY IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AND ON THE CONTINENT AS A WHOLE. OUR GENERAL TASK IS NOT TO CHANGE THIS BUT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH IS HIGHER HERE THAN IN ANY OTHER REGION ON EARTH, TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE IT BY AN EQUIVALENT REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY POTENTIALS OF THE SIDES. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS THROUGH EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

12. ONE OF THE PRINCIPLE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF ACHIEVING FIRST AGREEMENTS IS THE LACK OF DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA TO GIVE CONTRACTUAL GUARANTEES REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE AFTER THE REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA. FACTS ARE FACTS AND UNTIL THIS TIME SIX OUT OF SEVEN OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE DECLINED TO UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS IN THIS REGARD. CONTINGENTS FROM THE FORCES OF THESE COUNTRIES CONSTITUTE MORE THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH THE MOST MODERN TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND REPRESENT AN EXTREMELY CONSIDERABLE COMPONENT OF THE WHOLE NATO STRUCTURE IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE.

13. NATURALLY THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT REDUCE ITS ARMED FORCES
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WHILE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA FAIL TO TAKE UPON THEMSELVES AN OBLIGATION TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE IN A DEFINITE VOLUME AND IN DEFINITE TIME PERIODS. WITHOUT AN UNDERTAKING BY THESE COUNTRIES OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION, AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST STAGE COVERING REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES CANNOT BE FULLY WORKED OUT AND IMPLEMENTED. THE BALL IS THEREFORE IN THE COURT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

14. THE ARBITRARY ATTEMPT BY THE NATO COUNTRIES TO NARROW THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THEIR OWN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE SERIOUSLY HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE TRYING TO REDUCE THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE REDUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL, SELECTIVELY AND DELIBERATELY CHOSEN COMPONENTS OF ARMED FORCES - IN THE MAIN, GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL.

15. IN VIEW OF THIS THE WESTERN STATES REFUSE TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS OF THEIR AIR FORCES. IN THE PRESENT ROUND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ONCE AGAIN EMPHASISED THAT THE AGREEMENT TO REDUCE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEST ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE ANY KIND OF READINESS

TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCES.

16. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROVE HERE THE IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY THIS FORM OF ARMED FORCE IN MODERN TIMES. THE MODERISATION MEASURES WHICH ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN AT THE PRESENT TIME BY NATO COUNTRIES PROVE THIS IN THEMSELVES. ONE SHOULD NOT DOUBT THAT AN INCREASE IN AIR FORCE IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE RESULTING IN AN EVEN HIGHER CONCENTRATION THAN THE PRESENT ONE CAN ONLY CAUSE IN THIS REGION AN INCREASE IN TENSION AND AN AGGRAVATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND AN INCREASE IN THE DANGER OF CONFLICT BREAKING OUT AS A RESULT OF CHANCE OR MISCALCULATION.
THEREFORE IT IS NECESSARY, ALONG WITH THE REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES TO REDUCE THE PERSONNEL OF AIR FORCES TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

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17. THE APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO THE QUESTION OF REDUCING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME. THE WESTERN DELEGATINS WILL NOT GIVE THEIR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND OF THE NUCLEAR POTENTIALS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN FULL VOLUME. AT THE SAME TIME THE WEST TRIES TO PLAY DOWN IN DISCUSSING QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMAMENTS. SIMULTANEOUSLY THEY KEEP QUIET ABOUT THE FACT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPRESENT THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF STATES AND OF PEOPLES PARTICULARLY IN SUCH A THICKLY POPULATED REGION AS CENTRAL EUROPE.

18. IT IS LOGICAL TO POSE THE QUESTION: IS IT POSSIBLE TO EFFECTIVELY REDUCE THE HIGH LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WITHOUT TAKING IN FULLY THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? AND SECONDLY: DOES THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS IN ANY WAY ESTABLISH SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO THE GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE ARMS RACE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS? IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE POSITIVE IN RESPONSE TO EITHER OF THESE TWO QUESTIONS.

19. THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS STATE THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT OUR WISHES WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY HAVING AGREED TO REDUCE A CERTAIN PART OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY EMPHASISE THAT THIS MEASURE IS

OF A ONE-TIME CHARACTER AND DOES NOT AT ALL MEAN WESTERN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE NECESSITY OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE THAT THE

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FROM US REP MBFR

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ONE-TIME REDUCTION OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST FITS IN FULLY WITH MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONRY OF NATO IN EUROPE AND TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITIONING. IN THE SAME WAY AS FAR AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE WESTERN POSITION THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF TWO TYPES OF MEANS OF DELIVERY IN THE AMERICAN ARMY (SIC) CAN BE FULLY COMPENSATED FOR BY AN INCREASE OF THESE SAME ARMAMENTS BY OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. PUT IN ANOTHER WAY SUCH A REDUCTION IS OF EXCEEDINGLY LIMITED SIGNIFICANCE AND DOES NOT MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE QUESTION OF MILITARY RELAXATION IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA.

20. LET US TAKE ONE FURTHER ELEMENT IN THE POSITION OF WESTERN COUNTRIES, THEIR APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS. THEY INSIST ON A COMPLETELY INEQUITABLE METHOD OF REDUCTION ACCORDING TO WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD REDUCE CONFIDENTIAL

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THEIR FORCES BY WHOLE MILITARY FORMATIONS, THAT IS BY FORMATIONS AND UNITS, WHILE THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD REDUCE BY INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMENT TAKEN SELECTIVELY FROM DIFFERENT UNITS. IN THE FIRST CASE IT IS A MATTER OF AN EFFECTIVE FORCE REDUCTION. AS CONCERNS

THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES
THIS HARDLY LEADS TO A REAL REDUCTION OF MILITARY POWER. ON THE
CONTRARY IT CAN BE FULLY ACCOMMODATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
THE REORGANISATION OF THE NATO ARMED FORCES AND THAT HAS NOTHING
IN COMMON WITH THE AIMS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

21. IN THIS CONNECTION ONE CANNOT PASS OVER SILENTLY THE
ASSERTIONS BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS THAT THE ADDITIONS TO THEIR
SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS INTRODUCED ON 16 DECEMBER 1975 MAKE THEIR
POSITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOCIALIST STATES. IT IS PERMISSIBLE
TO ASK WHETHER THESE PROPOSALS REALLY INTRODUCE SOME CHANGE INTO
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS. TODAY WE
HAVE SHOWN ONCE AGAIN THAT THE POSITION OF THE NATO COUNTRIES HAS
CONSERVED ALL ITS BASIC INADEQUACIES OF A PRINCIPLED CHARACTER
EVEN IN 1976. AT THE SAME TIME WESTERN STATES HAVE MADE THE
REALISATION OF THEIR PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN
PART OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONRY DEPENDENT UPON THE

ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR REDUCTION SCHEME AS A WHOLE.

22. AS IS KNOWN, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES
ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITIONS, THEIR ATTEMPT TO DERIVE
UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE BY REFERENCE TO THE SO-CALLED
"GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR". BUT THESE REFERENCES ARE UNCONVINCING.

23. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE A MILITARY SPECIALIST IN ORDER
TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, JUST AS MANY OTHERS,
WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY EACH STATE-PARTICIPANT IN THE PROCESS
OF PUTTING TOGETHER ITS MILITARY STRUCTURE, AND LONG BEFORE THE
BEGINNING OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE
WAS RECOGNISED IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS WHICH DEFINED
THE AREA OF REDUCTION AND THEREBY DREW A LINE UNDER THE
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QUESTION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR. TO RETURN TO IT
IN THE DISCUSSION TODAY IS TO DIVERT THE DELEGATIONS
AWAY FROM THE SOLUTION OF THE TASKS BEFORE THEM. IN ESSENCE,
THIS IS POSING THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
OF AN OUTBREAK OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND
CONCERNING THE MOBILISATION CAPABILITIES OF THE SIDES IN CASE
OF WAR. BUT ASSESSING EACH OTHERS CAPABILITIES FOR CARRYING ON
COMBAT OPERATIONS IS NOT OUR TASK. BEFORE THE PARTICIPANTS
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS ANOTHER GOAL - TO AREE UPON MEASURES
FOR REDUCING THE PRESENT HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN THE
CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
REDUCTION OF FORCES IN THIS AREA WILL DECREASE AS WELL THE
VERY POSSIBILITY OF AN OUTBREAK HERE OF ARMED CONFLICT.

24. PROCEEDING FROM THE RESULTS OF THE 10TH ROUND, WE
PROPOSE THAT THE EFFORTS OF DELEGATIONS BE CONCENTRATED IN THE

FUTURE ON THE PRACTICAL WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.
WE SUGGEST THAT IF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD STUDY TO THE NECESSARY DEGREE THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, THEN ALREADY IN THE NEXT ROUND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE MATTER OF AN AGREED DRAFT AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE FIRST STAGE OF REDUCTION.

25. IN ADDITION WE BELIEVE THAT ALREADY IN THE NEXT ROUND IT IS NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE NON-INCREASE OR "FREEZE" OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES FOR THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT CONTINUES TO BE NECESSARY. WE CANNOT BUT DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT DURING THE PERIOD WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ARE BEING CONDUCTED THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN INTENSIFYING IN THE WEST TO EXTEND THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF NATO. IN NUMEROUS SPEECHES BY LEADING FIGURES OF THIS BLOC THERE APPEAR TENDENTIOUS THESE CONCERNING THE INCREASES ALLEGEDLY TAKING PLACE IN THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED "GROWTH OF THE SOVIET THREAT".

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THIS I AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THEIR OWN REQUIREMENTS FOR A FURTHER INCREASE IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND FOR AN INCREASE IN ARMAMENTS. IF IN THE WEST THERE REALLY EXIST THE APPREHENSIONS OF WHICH THE LEADERS OF NATO SPEAK, THEN WHY DO THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS REFUSE TO AGREE ON A "FREEZE" OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EVEN FOR THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS? THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST AND THEREFORE AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT STEP ON THE PATH OF LIMITING THE ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

26. THE SOCIALIST STATES, PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT THERE ARE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FIRST PRACTICAL RESULTS AND FOR THE WORKING OUT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS STATED WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE BUCHAREST MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY. OF COURSE, SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL COME ONLY WHEN ALL PARTICIPANTS, AND NOT ONLY THE SOCIALIST STATES, WILL OBSERVE THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF NOT OBTAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO ANYONE.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

27. OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING ALREADY AFTER MORE THAN THREE YEARS. IT MUST NOT BE SAID THAT THESE YEARS WERE SPENT IN VAIN. AND EVEN THOUGH IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE STUDY OF THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES TOOK TOO MUCH TIME, THIS CIRCUMSTANCE BY ITSELF IS STILL NOT GROUNDS FOR PESSIMISM. ON THE CONTRARY, IT SHOULD URGE ON ALL PARTICIPANTS TOWARD THE MAXIMAL ACTIVISATION AND CONCRETISATION OF THEIR ACTIVITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

28. SOON THERE BEGINS A RECESS IN OUR WORK. HOWEVER, THE MILITARY

CONFRONTATION AND THE ARMS RACE IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT KNOWS NO RECESS. IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE USE OF THE FORTHCOMING PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT ROUND IN SUCH A WAY AS FINALLY TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE

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VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO COME TO THE WORKING OUT OF THE FIRST PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS. IN THIS SENSE THE NEXT ROUND SHOULD HAVE A SPECIAL RATHER THAN A ROUTINE CHARACTER. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE THEN TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE TASKS WHICH CONFRONT THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHETHER THIS OCCURS OR NOT DEPENDS UPON WHETHER

THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL FINALLY ENTER UPON THE PATH OF
REALISM AND OF CONSTRUCTIVE SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
AGREEMENT. END TEXTRESOR

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Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DEC 16 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT THE 123RD MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE FINAL ONE OF THE CURRENT ROUND, TOOK PLACE ON DEC 16 UND
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
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